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After its narrow re-election in June 2010, the Australian Labor government undertook 
a series of public inquiries into reform of Australian media, communications and 
copyright laws. One important driver of policy reform was the government’s 
commitment to building a National Broadband Network (NBN), and the implications 
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this had for existing broadcasting and telecommunications policy, as it would 
constitute a major driver of convergence of media and communications access devices 
and content platforms. These inquiries included: the Convergence Review of media 
and communications legislation; the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 
review of the National Classification Scheme; the Independent Media Inquiry 
(Finkelstein Review) into Media and Media Regulation; and the ALRC review of 
Copyright and the Digital Economy.  
 
One unusual feature of this review process, discussed in the paper, was the degree to 
which academics were involved in the process, not simply as providers of expert 
opinion, but as review chairs seconded from their universities. This paper considers 
the role played by activist groups in all of these inquiries and their relationship to the 
various participants in the inquiries, as well as the implications of academics being 
engaged in such inquiries, not simply as activist-scholars, but as those primarily 
responsible for delivering policy review outcomes. The latter brings to the forefront 
issues arising in from direct engagement with governments and state agencies 
themselves, which challenges traditional understandings of the academic community 
as “critical outsiders” towards such policy processes.  
 





Academics and Activists in the Policy Process: 





In their overview of recent work in European communications policy research, 
Natascha Just and Manuel Puppis observe that the field of communications policy 
research has ‘traditionally proved to be a self-critical as well as self-conscious (and 
not always self-confident) area of research’ (Just and Puppis, 2012: 3). While noting a 
familiar degree of ‘self-castigation’ among communications policy researchers, they 
also identified a greater degree of ‘self-confidence’ (Just and Puppis, 2012: 20) in the 
communications policy research field in recent years about the potential to influence 
governments and policy-makers. Other academics in the field have made similar 
observations. Aslama and Napoli (2011: 336) referred to policy windows which had 
been opened by the degree to which media convergence disrupted established media 
business models and longstanding policy settlements, that could be fruitfully aligned 
with alliances that emerged in the U.S. in the 2000s between communication policy 
researchers and public interest media activists and advocacy groups. In the European 
context, Just and Puppis’s collection drew attention to the degree to which 
communications researchers, and not simply those from other disciplines such as 
economics and law who have an interest in communication policy, were being sought 
out by policy-makers prepared to support communications research that was clearly 
independent of vested interests in order to improve the overall quality of decision-
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making. In an overview of academics’ engagement with questions of Internet 
governance, Peng Hwa Ang (2008: 451) has suggested that academic input is most 
likely to be sought ‘where the subject matter under discussion is new and policy 
makers are uninformed’, and where ‘there is a culture of consultation beyond the 
circle of usual suspects of the policy makers’. Sandra Braman (2010: 23) has argued 
that the rapidity of current technological changes, and the need for policy responses 
that ‘turn away from the technologies and towards that which is being mediated – the 
public’, has opened up such potentially fortuitous policy opportunities.  
 
In this paper I want to consider the opening (and closing) of ‘policy windows’ in 
Australia in the period from 2011 to 2013, and some wider implications of the 
developments of this period. After its narrow re-election in June 2010, the Gillard 
Labor government undertook a series of public inquiries into Australian media and 
communications laws and policies, which included: the Convergence Review of 
media and communications legislation; the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) review of the National Classification Scheme; the Independent Media 
Inquiry (Finkelstein Review) into Media and Media Regulation; and the ALRC 
review of Copyright and the Digital Economy. It was also involved in developing a 
National Cultural Policy, as well as a series of other smaller inquiries into issues such 
as Internet gambling, data retention requirements for telecommunications companies 
and Internet Service Providers, rural and regional telecommunications, and the digital 
television switchover. An important driver of policy reform was the government’s 
commitment to building a National Broadband Network (NBN), and the implications 
this would have for existing broadcasting and telecommunications policy, as it would 
constitute a major driver of convergence of media and communications access devices 
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and content platforms. What resulted was the most extensive review of media and 
communications policy in Australia since the early 1990s, and I have elsewhere 
referred to it as a convergent media policy moment in Australian media, 
communications and cultural policy (Flew, 2012).  
 
One notable feature of this period was that academics engaged in the process, not only 
as providers of expert opinion or as ‘scholar-activists’ working with a variety of 
media reform, law reform and advocacy groups, but as individuals themselves 
chairing the reviews, under secondment from their universities. This was my personal 
experience, as I was seconded from QUT to chair the National Classification Scheme 
Review. In addition, Professor Matthew Ricketson (University of Canberra) co-
chaired the Finkelstein Review, and Professor Jill McKeough (University of 
Technology, Sydney) chaired the ALRC Copyright Review. This is consistent with a 
history of engagement among Australian media, communications and cultural studies 
academics with policy processes, discussed by – among others – Cunningham (1992, 
2013), Bennett (1998, 2007), Turner (2012) and Miller (2013). But it does in turn 
raise some new questions about the relationship of academics to the policy process, 
being engaged the implications of academics being engaged not simply as those 
critically engaging with the labour of policy advocacy, but being primarily 
responsible for delivering policy review outcomes. Such experiences bring to the 
forefront issues arising in from direct engagement with governments and state 
agencies themselves, which challenges traditional understandings of the academic 




2. Media Policy Reform in Australia 
 
Australian media and communications policy last underwent a series of major 
changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Under the agenda of ‘microeconomic 
reform’, adopted as a core principle of the Labor government led by Bob Hawke after 
its re-election in 1987, a commitment was made to enable greater competition in the 
telecommunications industry and to revise broadcasting legislation. The 
Telecommunications Act 1989 enabled new entrants into the Australian 
telecommunications market, while the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 provided a 
legislative framework for the development of a cable (pay) television sector, as well 
as introducing co-regulatory codes into broadcasting (Hawke, 1995). Changes to 
media ownership laws passed in 1986 enabled greater concentration of ownership 
within an industry, while setting stronger limits on cross-media ownership. The major 
consequence of such changes was the consolidation of control by News Limited (a 
subsidiary of News Corporation, owned by Rupert Murdoch) over Australian 
newspaper markets, to the point of controlling 65-70 per cent of the circulation of 
national and capital city dailies and having a monopoly in four of the eight capital city 
markets.  
 
For the most part, the legislation that was passed in the early 1990s continued to 
frame media policy in Australia. The Liberal-National Party coalition governments 
led by John Howard from 1996 made only minor changes to media laws. One 
significant development of the Howard years was the passing of the Broadcasting 
Services Amendment (Online Services) Act 1999, which gave the Australian 
Broadcasting Authority (which became the Australian Communications and Media 
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Authority in 2005) the legislative power to classify and censor Internet content 
through a complaints-based mechanism. It also required the Internet Industry 
Association (IIA) to develop a co-regulatory code of practice that included 
requirements on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to enable their customers to filter 
inappropriate online content, and to block access to banned material upon receipt of a 
‘take down notice from the ACMA (Coroneos, 2008). In contrast to the co-regulatory 
scheme as it has applied to broadcasting, which has been generally supported, the 
extension of the BSA to online content has always been contentious. By approaching 
online content in a manner akin to that of broadcasting, critics have argued that there 
has been a basic category confusion of media types, between broadcast media 
distributed nationally and accessed on a mass scale, and the global, dynamic, and 
user-driven Internet environment (Moses, 2010; Crawford and Lumby, 2011).  
 
In general terms, Australian media has a history of high levels of ownership 
concentration, and very powerful and politically connected media owners. Rupert 
Murdoch has been the most internationally famous example but others, such as the 
Packer family, have also been very important. Reformist media policy has typically 
been successfully resisted by big media interests (Flew and Swift, 2013), and the 
major television station owners have typically had a strong role in influencing policies 
relevant to their industry: the maintenance of restrictions of the number of 
commercial broadcasting licence holders in a region despite the disappearance to 
spectrum scarcity rationales would be an example of this ongoing behind-the-scenes 
influence (Flew, 2006). Media policy activists have typically had more influence over 
policies related to media content rather than ownership rules, with the Australian 
content standard for commercial free-to-air broadcasters being an enduring policy 
 8 
feature, along with rules governing children’s programming and program standards 
such as time-zone restrictions (Flew, 2012; Potter, 2013).  
 
After eleven years of conservative governments led by John Howard, a Labor 
government led by Kevin Rudd took power in November 2007. While media policy 
had not been a feature of the campaign, the new government as strongly committed to 
developing a National Broadband Network (NBN) that would provide high-speed 
broadband to 90 per cent of Australian homes by 2017 (Barr, 2010; Singh, 2010). 
Developed in the context of a strategy to promote Australia as a leader in the digital 
economy, the NBN raised the issue of how applicable Australian broadcasting laws 
would be in an era where IPTV become more prominent, although there was little 
attention given to this in the first term of the Labor government. Indeed, during the 
first term, the major communications policy issue in the public domain concerned the 
plans of the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, 
Senator Stephen Conroy, to introduce a mandatory Internet filter to block content that 
would be Refused Classification under Australian law, and the opposition that this 
proposal generated among the online activist community.  
 
3. Australian Media Policy Reviews 2011-13 
 
After its narrow re-election in August 2010, the second Labor government – now led 
by Julia Gillard – commissioned a series of reviews of media and related policies. In 
March 2011, the Convergence Review was announced, asked to ‘review the current 
policy framework for the production and delivery of media content and 
communications services … [and] develop advice for the government on the 
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appropriate policy framework for a converged environment’. In doing so, the 
Committee was required to ‘have regard to all legislation and regulatory frameworks 
relevant to [its] terms of reference’ (Convergence Review Committee, 2012: 110). 
Also in March 2011, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) was given 
terms of reference to review the Classification Act 1995 and related legislation 
pertaining to censorship laws and classification guidelines, with reference to – among 
other things – ‘the rapid pace of technological change in media available to, and 
consumed by, the Australian community’ (ALRC, 2012a: 5).  
 
In September 2011, the Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation – 
also known as the Finkelstein Review after its chair, the Hon Ray Finkelstein QC – 
was established, with a remit to examine the effectiveness of current media codes of 
practice in Australia, how to strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the 
Australian Press Council (APC) as a newspaper industry self-regulatory agency, and 
other issues pertaining to media regulations on the basis of public interest criteria 
(Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation, 2012: 13). Finally, in 
June 2012 the ALRC was asked to review Australia’s copyright laws, with regard not 
only to ‘the objective of copyright law in providing an incentive to create and 
disseminate original copyright materials’ and ‘the general interest of Australians to 
access, use and interact with content in the advancement of education, research and 
culture’, but also to ‘the importance of the digital economy and the opportunities for 
innovation leading to national economic and cultural development created by the 
emergence of new digital technologies’. Professor Jill McKeough was seconded from 
the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) Law School to chair this review, that 
will release its final report in November 2013. 
 10 
 
a. Convergence Review 
 
The Convergence Review was dealing with what Lunt and Livingstone (2012), in 
their study of UK communications policy, referred to as the ‘discursive struggle’ 
between consumer interests and citizen interests, and whether recommendations for 
regulatory reform were primarily focused on economic goals such as promoting 
efficiency and innovation in media markets, or on public interest principles associated 
with policy areas such as local content production, community standards, and content 
diversity. 1 The Convergence Review Committee, chaired by Screen Australia CEO 
Glen Boreham, understood its own approach as broadly deregulatory, premised on the 
assumption that ‘the development of the digital economy should be led by the 
market’, and that unnecessary or redundant forms of regulation needed to be removed 
in order ‘to encourage new business and innovation and to reduce costs for businesses 
and consumers’ (Convergence Review Committee, 2012: 3).  It noted, however, that 
in the submissions it had received, and in the public consultations and industry 
meetings it conducted, there were two distinct constituencies: 
 
Many from industry argued that there is really little need for regulation at all, 
although some supported retaining regulation of commercial benefit to them. 
On the other hand, individuals and community groups identified areas where 
regulation should be retained and in some cases strengthened (Convergence 
Review Committee, 2012: 1).  
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In a report prepared for the Committee, the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority (ACMA) identified 55 broken concepts in broadcasting and 
telecommunications legislation, or elements of the current regulatory regime that were 
now redundant, inappropriate or unnecessary (ACMA, 2011). At the root of these 
‘broken concepts’ was the manner in which digital convergence was making media 
services and content increasingly independent of particular delivery technologies, 
meaning that ‘regulation constructed on the premise that content could (and should) 
be controlled by how it is delivered is losing its force, both in logic and in practice’ 
(ACMA, 2011: 6).  
 
In seeking to identify enduring principles that could underpin media regulation in a 
convergent environment, the Convergence Review identified three enduring public 
interest principles: 
 
• Media ownership—rules to set limits to media concentration and ensure 
diversity of news and commentary in order to maintain the free flow of news, 
commentary and debate in a democratic society; 
• Media content standards—the content available on different media services 
available to Australians should broadly reflect community standards and 
public expectations; 
• Production and distribution of Australian and local content—recognition of 
the social and cultural benefits of media content that broadly reflects 
Australian identity, character and diversity, that may be under-produced in the 




One of the core questions that faced the Convergence Review was how to reconcile a 
commitment to ongoing media regulation with an in-principle commitment that 
‘citizens and organisations should be able to communicate freely and, where 
regulation is required, it should be the minimum necessary to achieve a clear public 
purpose’ (Convergence Review Committee, 2012: 1). The related issue that it faced 
concerned how to move from the current architecture of platform-based regulations, 
which are profoundly challenged by media convergence, towards a framework that 
focuses on content, on the most significant media, and which involved ‘parity of 
treatment of similar services regardless of the underlying medium, platform or device 
used to deliver or receive the service’ (Convergence Review Committee, 2012: 15). 
The Review noted from its public consultations and submissions it received that a 
strong expectation continued to exist that professional media organisations would 
meet appropriate content standards even if this was not expected of most online media 
sites. It also identified concerns existed that any relaxation of existing controls over 
media ownership would further media concentration, with a consequent reduction in 
the range of news and commentary accessible from mainstream media outlets.  
 
The Convergence Review ought to reconcile these challenges with its concept of a 
Content Service Enterprise (CSE) that would be of sufficient size and influence to 
merit industry-specific forms of media regulation. A CSE was defined as (1) having 
control over professionally produced media content; (2) having a large number of 
Australian users of such content, deemed to be 500,000 or more users a month; and 
(3) to generate revenues in Australia from such Australian-sourced professional media 
content in excess of $A50 million a year. From the Convergence Review’s analysis, 
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such criteria would cover fifteen Australian media enterprises, including the major 
broadcasters and the large print media groups, but excluding – at least at this stage – 
companies such as Google, Apple and the telecommunications service provider 
Telstra. The concept of CSEs marked out the Convergence Review’s attempt to 
distinguish ‘big media’ from start-ups and user-created content sites, and was quite 
radical in its implications in terms of addressing the challenge of identifying those 
media organisations that would continue to be of influence, and hence subject to 
greater degrees of regulation, in a convergent media context where influence is no 
longer primarily defined by the content delivery platform.  
 
b. National Classification Scheme Review 
 
The ALRC Review of the National Classification Scheme was the first 
comprehensive review of media classification since the ALRC’s 1991 Review of 
Censorship and Classification that formed the basis of the Classification Act 1995. 
While that legislation resolved some of the difficulties presented by Australia’s 
complicated classification laws for media businesses and consumers, several matters 
remained unresolved. The failure to reach agreement on a national “X” classification 
for sexually explicit content meant that such material remained notionally illegal in 
some states of Australia, although being nonetheless conspicuously available 
throughout the country. The decision in 1995 to prohibit “R18+” rated video games 
from entering Australia on the basis of potential harm from exposure to violent video 
content had been an ongoing source of discontent among gamers, as it was obviously 
out of step with comparable nations around the world, but the need for agreement 
among all states and territories to make changes under the co-operative scheme with 
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the Commonwealth presented an ongoing barrier to reform (Delfabbro and King, 
2010). The Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act 1999 had placed 
censorship and classification enforcement responsibilities relating to the Internet 
within the communications portfolio, administered by the ACMA, but the power to 
classify or prohibit particular forms of media content resided with the Classification 
Board, as an independent agency administered within the Attorney-General’s 
Department. As a result, considerable uncertainly existed about who had 
responsibility for classification decisions, in addition to concerns among civil liberties 
groups about the accountability of the different regulatory agencies to the wider 
public.  
 
Classification legislation, like most of Australia’s media and communications laws, 
was designed for a pre-Internet age, when media content was largely accessed either 
in a tangible physical form, or through mass media channels such as broadcasting and 
cinema. The Labor government managed to trigger a need to review classification 
laws itself through the plans of the Minister for Broadband, Communication and the 
Digital Economy, Sen. Stephen Conroy, to introduce mandatory Internet filtering for 
content that would be Refused Classification (RC) under Australian laws. As well as 
raising the inherent difficulty of how to deal with online content mostly hosted 
outside Australia and mechanisms of compliance by ISPs, this proposal also drew 
attention to the problematic nature of the RC category. Under current laws, the RC 
category included not only material that was clearly illegal to produce, distribute or 
possess, such as child abuse material, but also material that may be deemed 
‘abhorrent’ or ‘offensive’ – raising the obvious questions of ‘by whom’ and ‘on what 
criteria’ – and, perhaps most confusingly, material that ‘promotes, incites or instructs 
 15 
in matters of crime or violence’ (ALRC, 2012a: 58). Moreover, in the absence of an 
“R18+” classification for video games, such content became de facto banned material.  
 
The ALRC received over 2,300 public submissions to its classification review. Of 
these, the largest number came from those calling for a lifting of the ban on “R18+” 
video games, followed by those calling for an approach to media classification more 
informed by free speech and civil liberties principles, and those taking the opposing 
view that community standards and the protection of children were paramount. 2 In 
articulating a new set of principles to inform future media classification laws, the 
ALRC took the view that while core principles such as balancing the rights of adults 
to access the media of their choice with protection of children and a benchmark 
category of ‘community standards’ had ongoing relevance, there was a need to 
develop a framework that was more responsive to technological change and kept 
classification regulation to a minimum necessary to achieve a clear public purpose. It 
proposed that any new classification legislation needed to be platform neutral in its 
application, so that ‘the obligation to classify content should be framed without 
reference to the media platform from which the content is accessed’ (ALRC, 2012a: 
128). It was argued that a platform neutral approach to content regulation was an 
essential condition for a classification framework that would remain relevant and 






c. Finkelstein Review 
 
The context for the Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation 
(Finkelstein Review) was complaints about the hostile media coverage of the Gillard 
Labor government, with the impact of the UK phone hacking scandals and the 
subsequent Leveson Inquiry providing a justification for undertaking such an inquiry. 
The leader of the Australian Greens, Senator Bob Brown first publicly proposed the 
need for an inquiry into the news media, citing anti-Greens and anti-Labor bias in 
News Limited papers, and Prime Minister Julia Gillard subsequently used the 
opportunity of a National Press Club address on 14 July 2011 to raise issues about the 
standard of political reporting in Australia, and asked whether News Limited had 
‘questions to answer’ about the conduct of its newspapers (Flew and Swift, 2013). 
When the Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation was announced 
in September 2011, its terms of reference referred to the adequacy of current media 
codes of practice and the effectiveness of self-regulation through the Australian Press 
Council, but also to the impact of technological change on the business models that 
had supported journalism and the production of news in Australia. In practice, far 
more of its attention was focused on the issue of journalistic standards, and how to 
make use of regulation in order to improve them, than on the future of news in the 
context of media convergence.  
 
The Finkelstein Review took a ‘social responsibility of media’ perspective, which it 
contrasted to a ‘marketplace of ideas’ understanding of the media’s role in society and 
politics. It argued that the latter was insufficient in the context of highly concentrated 
ownership in the Australian newspaper industry, and the power of the media to shape 
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social and political realities. It identified consistent findings in pubic opinion surveys 
about Australian media industry standards including: low levels of public trust in 
journalists as a professional group; concerns about conflicts of interest in news 
reporting; perceptions of political bias towards the conservative parties among 
commercial media outlets (particularly newspapers); concerns about excessive media 
power and influence; and concerns about unethical behaviour, particularly in relation 
to intrusions on individual privacy (Finkelstein, 2012: 104-20). Observing that 
‘Australia’s journalists … seem more satisfied than is the general public with their 
standards of objectivity and the general quality of their work’ (Finkelstein, 2012: 
123), the Finkelstein Review was nonetheless of the view that the current system of 
print media regulation, which combines self-regulation through the adoption of 
standards and codes of ethics with the role played by the Australian Press Council as 
an industry-funded external complaints body, had proven to be manifestly inadequate 
in serving the public interest.  
 
The Finkelstein Review recommended the establishment of a government-funded 
statutory regulatory, the News Media Council, that would incorporate the current 
functions of the APC and those of the ACMA that related to broadcast news and 
current affairs. The News Media Council would be made up of community, industry 
and professional representatives, including academics, and would operate as an 
independent agency, with the powers to address complaints, set journalistic standards 
hold public hearings if required, and require news media outlets to publish an 
apology, correction or retraction, or afford a person a right to reply, in relation to 
adverse findings. The News Media Council would be neither a government regulator 
nor a self-regulatory industry body, but rather a co-regulatory hybrid mechanism 
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engaged in what the Report termed ‘enforced self-regulation’ where industry 
participants would  participate in the setting and enforcement of standards, but where 
participation would be required rather than voluntary (Independent Inquiry into the 
Media and Media Regulation 2012: 287).  
 
The Finkelstein Inquiry was mired in political controversy from the moment it was 
announced, which continued through its public hearings, and was abundantly apparent 
in the responses to its final report. The major newspaper groups never accepted the 
legitimacy of the inquiry, arguing that it constituted an attempt by the Labor 
government to muzzle freedom of the press. This argument found ample support from 
the Liberal and National Parties, who defined the Finkelstein Review as an exercise in 
political payback by Labor and the Greens for negative media coverage. Market 
liberal think tanks such as the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) rejected outright the 
premise of the inquiry that media had a social responsibility remit, vigorously arguing 
that a marketplace of ideas is a cornerstone of democratic freedoms, that greater 
competition was the only means to redress undue media influence, and that the rise of 
the internet and the lowering of barriers to entry for online publishing were 
themselves forces driving greater media pluralism, without the need for new forms of 
government intervention (Berg, 2012). Given this framing, the adverse reaction to the 
Finkelstein Review in the print media was no surprise, with the Finkelstein Review 
being variously labelled as ‘Bringing the media to heel’ (The Australian, 3 March 
2012), a ‘Labor Plan to Control the Media’ (Australian Financial Review, 3 March 
2012), and ‘A threat to free speech and to media big and small’ (Penberthy, 2012). 
From the point of view of the media industry, Kim Williams, then-CEO of News 
Limited, summarised their perspective as being that ‘if print and online media are to 
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continue to be able to robustly question, challenge and keep governments in check 
they must remain self-regulated, entirely independent of government’ (quoted in 
Crowe, 2012). 
 
d. Copyright and the Digital Economy Review 
 
The Terms of Reference for the ALRC’s review of the Copyright Act 1968 required 
the Commission to consider not only how to balance the objective of copyright law to 
provide an incentive to create and disseminate original copyright materials with the 
interest in enabling the public to be able to more widely access, use and interact with 
content in the advancement of education, research and culture. It was also asked to do 
so in the context of the digital economy, and ‘the opportunities for innovation leading 
to national economic and cultural development created by the emergence of new 
digital technologies’ (ALRC, 2013a: 5). In its Issues Paper, the ALRC noted that the 
inquiry’s terms of reference required it to consider how ‘the context and political 
economy of copyright law is changing as copyright has a more direct impact on 
disparate users and producers, extending beyond rights holders and institutional rights 
users’ (ALRC, 2012b: 14). 
 
The ALRC’s Final Report will be released in November 2013, but the almost 900 
public submissions it has received present strong claims about the costs and benefits 
of the current copyright regime on both sides of the ledger. In order to manage the 
inherently conflictual nature of copyright debates, the ALRC has sought to adopt a 
principle based approach to its recommendations, whereby the public interest is 
identified around the five goals of: acknowledging and respecting authorship and 
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creation; maintaining incentives for the creation of new works; promoting fair access 
to and the wide dissemination of content; providing rules that are flexible and 
adaptive to new technologies; and providing rules that are consistent with Australia’s 
international obligations (e.g. the 2005 UA-Australia Free Trade Agreement). In 
doing so, it is aiming for a technology neutral approach so that: 
 
In a converged media environment, where a multitude of different 
technologies can be used to create and distribute content, it is imperative that 
regulation does not restrict or impede technological innovation and investment 
because of artificial and outdated technological limitations (ALRC 2013a: 33).  
 
4. Academic and Activist Engagement with the Inquiries 
 
Of the four inquiries considered, the Convergence Review was arguably the most 
traditional in its modes of public engagement. With a three-person committee of 
people well known in the media and communication industries, and working with the 
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, the Committee 
primarily engaged with companies, industry bodies, funding agencies and 
professional associations that were long established in these industries, and were 
clearly stakeholders in the Committee’s deliberations. There was engagement with the 
inquiry by university-based groups, including the Australian Research Council Centre 
of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation, the Institute for a Broadband-
Enabled Society based at the University of Melbourne, the Swinburne Institute for 
Social Research, and the Communications Law Centre at the University of 
Technology, Sydney (UTS), as well as individual academics such as Brian Fitzgerald 
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(Law, Queensland University of Technology), Lelia Green (Communications, Edith 
Cowan University), Niloufer Selvadurai (Law, Macquarie University) and Tim Dwyer 
and Fiona Martin (Media and Communication, University of Sydney). But for the 
most part the Convergence Review engaged with the established media industry 
stakeholders, with only limited engagement with either academic researchers or 
activist communities. When research was commissioned for the Convergence Review, 
this was undertaken either by the ACMA or by consultants such as 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers.  
 
The National Classification Scheme Review operated according to the three-stage 
process applied by the ALRC to all public inquiries, which is that submissions are 
sought after release of an Issues Paper and a subsequent Discussion Paper, and that 
consultations with relevant stakeholders occurs throughout the time period of the 
inquiry (ALRC, 2013b). The review was chaired by an academic, Professor Terry 
Flew, from the Queensland University of Technology, and Flew was seconded to the 
ALRC for the duration of the review; notably, he was not someone with a legal 
background. While there was only one university-based research centre that made a 
formal submission to the review, the Communications Law Centre (UTS), individual 
academics who made submissions included Lyria Bennett Moses (Law, UNSW), Nic 
Suzor (Law, QUT), Alan McKee (Film & Television, QUT), Cathy Cupitt (Curtin 
University), Gregor Urbas (Australian National University), and Bruce Arnold and 
Sarah Ailwood (University of Canberra). Non-government organisations with an 
interest in classification issues and significant academic involvement also 
participated, including the Australian Council on Children and the Media, Electronic 
Frontiers Australia and the Young & Well Cooperative Research Centre. Other 
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academic experts consulted by the ALRC for the review included communications 
researcher Lelia Green (Edith Cowan University), economist Jason Potts (Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology), sociologist John Western (University of 
Queensland) and media researchers Catharine Lumby (University of New South 
Wales), Kate Crawford (University of New South Wales), and Andy Ruddock 
(Monash University).  
 
By far the most active response from the academic community was to the Finkelstein 
Review. Of the 75 submissions received by the review, 22 came from academics. 
Moreover, 10 of the 31 individuals who participated in the public hearings associated 
with the review were academics. The chair, Hon Ray Finkelstein QC, was assisted by 
Matthew Ricketson, Professor of Journalism at the University of Canberra, who was 
seconded to the review: it also drew upon the research inputs of political scientist 
Rodney Tiffen (University of Sydney), media economist Franco Papandrea 
(University of Canberra) and media ethicist Denis Muller (University of Melbourne).  
 
The majority of submissions received from these academics were highly critical of the 
‘marketplace of ideas’ as a suitable governing principle for understanding the role of 
media in modern democracies, and saw the Australian Press Council as a body that 
lacked both appropriate powers and sufficient independence from media proprietors 
to effectively regulate the conduct of journalists and news organisations so as to 
safeguard the public interest.  Despite the reputation subsequently circulated that 
journalism academics used the Finkelstein Review process to call for more 
government regulation of news media, very few actually favoured a statutory 
regulator as an alternative to industry self-regulation. Margaret Simons from the 
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University of Melbourne, who was subsequently identified in News Limited 
publications as a critic of press freedom, observed in her submission that: 
 
Government regulation and journalism are like oil and water. They won't mix. 
Good journalism relies on being unauthorized, but that doesn't mean that 
journalists shouldn't be held to account (Simons, 2011: 13).  
 
Simons’ submission, like others, favoured arms’ length government funding for the 
Australian Press Council, combined with long-term funding arrangements from the 
industry. Others favoured government support for alternative media providers or 
taxation arrangements that may support new investment in public interest journalism.  
 
The ALRC’s Copyright and the Digital Economy has, perhaps not surprisingly, been 
of more interest to legal scholars than those from media and communications. In 
addition to the active role as submitters played by individuals such as Matthew 
Rimmer (Australian National University), Kathy Bowrey (University of New South 
Wales), Nicolas Suzor (QUT) and Kimberlee Weatehrall (University of Sydney), 
there have been contributions from university-based research centres such as the ARC 
Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation, the Cyberspace Policy & 
Policy Centre, and the Intellectual Property, Media & Communications Law Research 
Network at UTS. As a Professor of Law at UTS, Jill McKeough has sought to engage 
legal scholars and others involved in copyright research, particularly in light of the 
large number of industry submissions received for this inquiry. It can also be noted 
that the university sector in general has an interest in copyright law reform, as 
indicated by submissions from Universities Australia, as well as through professional 
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associations to which they may be aligned, such as the Australian Association of 
Writing Programs and the Australian Teachers of Media.  
 
Of all of these engagements, it was academic involvement in the Finkelstein Review 
that generated by far the most political controversy. Put simply, many of these 
academics were accused in the media, particularly in News Limited newspapers, of 
betraying the interests of the journalistic profession in supporting the Finkelstein 
Review’s recommendation for a News Media Council to be established that would be 
a statutory regulator funded by government but with an independent membership. 
Cameron Stewart, Associate Editor of The Australian (Australia’s major national 
daily newspaper) referred to a ‘great divide’ between those who teach journalism and 
those who practice it: 
 
The contrasting view on Finkelstein's findings between the teachers of 
tomorrow's journalists and today's working journalists could not have been 
more pronounced. It highlights a widening rift in Australia between those who 
practice journalism and those who teach it. It is a rift being fuelled by politics, 
ideology and a growing disdain among some journalism academics for the 
mass media (Stewart, 2012).  
 
Rod Tiffen, Professor of Government at the University of Sydney, and who was 
involved in the inquiry, sought to respond to these and other criticisms that the 
Reivew ‘overturned two centuries of Western philosophy’ – as John Roskam of the 
IPA put it –  by attacking freedom of the press. He noted that in Britain the Press 
Complaints Commission, an equivalent body to the Australian Press Council, had 
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been dissolved in light of its ineffectiveness as shown with the phone hacking 
scandal, and defended the Finkelstein Review’s proposal: 
 
So two centuries of Western thought comes down to this - the right of editors 
to withhold from their readers the knowledge of an unwelcome adjudication 
on one of their stories by their peers and public according to standards they all 
profess to hold. The proposal is an attempt to make the media more 
accountable to their readers and those covered in the news. It does not increase 
the power of government to censor or restrict the media in any way. It seeks to 
conciliate and resolve disputes about news coverage in ways that further the 
free flow and exchange of information rather than restricting it (Tiffen, 2012).  
 
Matthew Ricketson, who co-chaired the Finkelstein Review, argued that the Final 
Report had been subject to a campaign of deliberate misrepresentation on the part of 
the media industry: 
 
The most recent and persuasive case study showing why there is an urgent 
need to reform regulation of the news media has been provided by the news 
media itself. And it's been provided in the way they have reported on the 
Independent Media Inquiry. What they have done is to under-report a lot of 
what was presented to the Independent Media Inquiry late last year, and to 
either misreport the inquiry's findings or to ignore large parts of the report 
altogether (Ricketson, 2012).  
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But the campaign against the Finkelstein Review had considerable public impact. The 
IPA claim that their membership trebled over the 2012-13 period, with its campaign 
against the Finkelstein Review being a major contributing factor. The opposition 
Liberal Party moved sharply against media regulation, and identified with the IPA 
around the notion of a ‘freedom agenda’ where, as Shadow Attorney-General George 
Brandis argued, ‘human rights and individual rights are synonymous’, and that the 
Liberal party was the only major Australian political party committed to ‘advancing 
and protecting the rights of the individual’, and to the principles of the Enlightenment 
against the political left, whose ‘role … historically, [has] been to trample upon the 
rights and freedoms of individual men and women in the name of messianic 
ideological causes (Brandis, 2013). This language of freedom and individual rights 
also came to influence elements of the political left. Visiting Australia at the time the 
Finkelstein Review published its final report, author and activist Naomi Wolf warned 
that it was ‘step one to fascism’ (Tiffen, 2012). Perhaps more notably, the activist 
group GetUp!, which tends to be politically aligned to the Australian Greens, came 
out in opposition to new forms of media regulation such as a public interest media 
advocate. In August 2012, the Director of GetUp!, Sam McLean, stated: 
 
We believe in freedom of the press, and the model of regulation that has been 
put forward seems to us to cut across that important freedom. Governments 
shouldn’t be choosing who gets to picking and choosing who gets to have a 
voice and who doesn’t … If people don’t like what is being written, they can 
stop buying it or find another way to get their message out … In an age of 
online news and media, there are a myriad of sources of news, and readers will 
be the arbiters (quoted in Packham, 2012).  
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Noting that this sounded very similar to what the IPA and the Liberal Party had been 
saying, GetUp! received a Tweet from the IPA shortly after saying ‘Great to have 
@GetUp join us on the barricades to defend free speech’. 
 
5. The Demise of Media Policy Reform in Australia in 2013 
 
The government response to the various media reviews was a long time coming, with 
the Minister responsible, Sen. Stephen Conroy, taking over a year to finally present a 
submission to Cabinet and to Labor caucus.3 When the proposed legislation to go to 
parliament was finally presented by the Minister on 12 March 2013, it was decidedly 
low-key in relation to the ambitions of the various media inquiries, and focused much 
more on current concerns and existing media players than on issues for the future of 
media raised by convergence and high-speed broadband access (Flew, 2013a). 
Among the main recommendations were a press standards model that maintained self-
regulation but beefs up the role of the Australian Press Council and clarified its 
standing in relation to online as well as print media, and the introduction of a Public 
Interest Test for future media takeovers and mergers, including the creation of a 
Public Interest Media Advocate (PIMA) to evaluate their implications for media 
diversity. This was certainly not the new policy and regulatory framework that the 
Convergence Review had advocated, nor did it introduce a new statutory body to 
regulate news media content, as recommended in the Finkelstein Review. 
Nonetheless, it proved to be too much for the newspapers that reported on the 
proposals, with the Sydney Daily Telegraph comparing Conroy to Joseph Stalin, Mao 
Tse-Tung and Robert Mugabe as political leaders woo wanted to control the media, 
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and also ‘Photo-shopping’ Stephen Conroy’s head onto Joseph Stalin in case readers 
had missed the point being made on the front page. It also became apparent that these 
more modest proposals could not be steered through the House of Representatives, 
where Labor lacked a majority and depended upon the support of Greens and 
independent MPs in order to pass legislation, and the legislation was abandoned ten 
days after it was presented to the public.  
 
During the five-week campaign leading up to the September 7, 2013 Australian 
Federal election, neither the Liberal Party nor Labor released a media policy. For the 
Liberals, this was not surprising: there was little doubt that they had the support of 
most large media organisations in Australia, who had also indicated little enthusiasm 
for the various media reform measures proposed during the 2011-13 period. 4 For 
Labor, however, this was akin to an admission of failure, for two reasons. First, they 
had in government associated the development of a high-speed National Broadband 
Network with the need for broader transformations to media law and policy, and the 
fact that so little had come from policy reviews designed to facilitate this was 
indicative of a degree of policy confusion over the issue within the government. 
Second, concerns about media bias remained widespread among Labor MPs and 
supporters. During the campaign, Kevin Rudd railed against the concentration of 
newspaper ownership in the hands of News Limited titles, and whether they were 
promoting the interests of their owner, Rupert Murdoch (Flew, 2013b). But the 
question of whether Labor had a policy towards concentration of media ownership 





I will conclude the paper with three points. First, one of the interesting features of the 
inquiries I have discussed has been the extent of academic involvement, both as those 
working in support of activist agendas towards particular policy fields – media 
ownership, copyright laws, journalism ethics, media content laws – but as the chairs 
of these public inquiries. Sandra Braman (2003a: 35) has pointed out that ‘policy was 
defined as a research context for communications even before the field per se 
existed’, and there is a long – if at times controversial – history of extended 
interactions between communications researchers and the policy process. The 
involvement of reasonably senior academics in chairing such reviews under 
secondment from their universities is a process that has not been widely researched 
thus far. But it may be on the increase, at least in the Australian context. Former Head 
of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Peter Shergold, has spoken about 
the need ‘to widen this debate about the making of public policy and the role of 
academics, to include those who advocate for policy, those who deliver policy, and 
those who are the recipients of policy’, arguing that ‘each of those groups needs to be 
empowered if we're going to get better public policy made, and that academics can 
play a key role in that’ (Shergold, 2011). Such observations have been echoed by 
another recent Head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Terry Moran, 
although he has also noted the difficulties in moving between the institutional cultures 
of academic and the public service, whereby ‘both public servants and academics can 
have an unfortunate tendency to isolate themselves in familiar worlds with familiar 
people’ (Moran, 2011). 
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Further research on this question is likely to find that familiar questions about whether 
media and communications policy-making is best understood as an administrative 
process or a political one are likely to recur. In terms of the case studies I have 
considered here, the Finkelstein Review was clearly the most overtly political of the 
inquiries taking place, as the context for its establishment was perceived media bias 
against particular political parties, even if its terms of reference ranged more widely. 
While it is clear that the recommendations of the Finkelstein Review, and those of the 
previous government such as a Public Interest Media Advocate, would have no 
traction with a right-of-centre government, this is not the same as observing that 
challenges to existing media laws and policies arising from convergence will not 
present themselves as matters needing resolution regardless of the political party that 
is in office. In this light, the relationship of academics as policy administrators to the 
various interest groups associated with a particular policy domain will be more 
complex than that of simply siding with one set of interests over another e.g. 
supporting activists and NGOs over business interests. This may in turn leave those 
academics open to accusations of bad faith within both academic and activist 
communities for being ‘intellectually thin’ (Braman, 2003b: 429), even as they pursue 
the often stated goal in other contexts of being actively engaged with public policy as 
part of the process of knowledge exchange. Philip Schlesinger has commented that ‘to 
be a critic as well as a kind of insider raises hard questions about whether one can 
actually ride two horses at once’ (Schlesinger, 2013: 27): the case studies I have 
discussed here provide some opportunity to consider such a conundrum in the context 
of actual media policy practice.  
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The final point I would make refers to an interesting tension in media policy reform 
advocacy in a post-Internet world, which could be described as a tension between 
“statists” and “libertarians”. Much of the discourse in recent years about the rise of 
neoliberalism in media policy and other fields of public policy has associated it with 
what Clive Barnett (2005: 8) has described as ‘a clearly defined, purposive project 
pursued by specifiable interest groups’ to delegitimize the role of state agencies and to 
‘subordinate public values to those of the market.’ In practice, however, the picture is 
a lot more complicated. In the case of the National Classifications Scheme Review, 
the notionally ‘progressive’ position was one that wanted the agencies of the state out 
of regulating access to violent video games or pornography on the Internet, and was 
considerably more comfortable with changes to media policy that gave a greater role 
to industry bodies and to the free choices of consumers themselves. But in other 
contexts, such as those relating to the Convergence and Finkelstein Reviews, the 
public interest was seen as being served by a strengthening of laws related to media 
ownership and content, ranging from stronger public interest tests for media mergers 
to more effective action being taken towards breaches of journalistic ethics and the 
conduct of radio “shock jocks”. Such divergent positions on media regulation, which 
were clearly seen in the transition from strong support by parties such as the 
Australian Greens and Labor to ‘do something’ about the political power of the 
Murdoch media that led to the Finkelstein Review being announced in 2011, to 
groups such as GetUp! endorsing the ‘marketplace of ideas’ over state regulation in 
2013. It may be that such a divergence is indicative of wider tensions in progressive 
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1 It should be noted that in the Australian context, ‘local’ content most commonly 
refers to media content that is produced in Australia. While there is some policy 
interest in local content defined in terms of media produced in particular geographical 
regions, largely in relation to news, this is different to the principle of localism as 
defined in the US by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC).  
2 Prior to the ALRC Review, a consultation process initiative by the Attorney-
General’s Department on introducing an R18+ classification for computer games 
received over 58,000 submissions, of which 98% called for the introduction of such a 
classification.  
3  The fate of the government’s media legislation was also tied to the ongoing 
leadership tensions between the Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, and the former leader, 
Kevin Rudd, who was seeking to be re-elected as party leader. The responsible 
Minister, Sen. Stephen Conroy, was a strong supporter of Gillard’s, and it is believed 
that there was a reluctance to table detailed information to Caucus for fear that it may 
be leaked to the media by Rudd supporters, although details of the inner workings of 
Labor Caucus during this period will no doubt be later revealed in the writings of 
those who were involved. In June 2013, after an unsuccessful attempt to return to the 
leadership and an aborted leadership spill, Kevin Rudd was elected Labor leader by 
the majority of Caucus, and went to the 7 September 2013 Federal election as Prime 
Minister.  
4 It is always difficult to gauge if any media organisation supported one political party 
or another unless they donated to their campaign, and we do not know at this stage 
whether any did donate to parties in the 2013 Federal election (they tend not to, as a 
general rule). What we do know is that, of all of the newspaper editorials published 
advocating a vote for one or other party, only one newspaper – the Melbourne Age – 
recommended a vote for Labor. At least two newspapers, the Sydney Daily Telegraph 
and the Brisbane Courier-Mail ran very strongly against Labor, although this id not 
lead to particularly large swings to the Liberals in those electorates where they may 
be most influential, such as the marginal seats of western Sydney and suburban 
Brisbane.  
